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TORTURING THE RULE OF LAW: USA AND THE POST
9-11 LEGAL WORLD
BY JACKSON MAOGOTO & BENEDICT SHEEHY
SCHOOL OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE, NSW
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, Anglo common law nations have championed the
concept of "Rule of Law" as a universal. In this view, the law is
considered to be an eternal, first principle, providing absolutes of
right and wrong, which demand obedience from the ruled as well
as the rulers. In contradistinction is the arbitrary "Rule of Men."
The Rule of Men has no absolute or fundamental principles, save
the transitory whims of the Ruler. "Rule of Men" despots use
their all-encompassing power for personal reasons, arbitrarily,
not only to punish their enemies and reward their friends, but to
create a climate of fear among their citizenry, curbing dissent
and free expression.
Whereas the Rule of Men is based upon the whims of those in
power, the Rule of Law is based upon a different principle-a
robust view of rights. Over time a consensus has emerged that
human rights are the most fundamental of all rights. In this
view human rights are not rights granted by a state; rather, they
are rights that pre-exist the state. As such they cannot be
withheld, or denied. They can only be respected or violated.
Because of their dominant, fundamental and preeminent position
in democratic societies, a state's observation of human rights
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serves as an indicator or gauge of a state's respect for the Rule of
law and its citizens. Observation of human rights also indicates
a state's willingness to accept principle and law as more
important than the expediency of short-term objectives,
achieving political goals or the satisfaction of special interest
constituencies.
Among the Rule of Law nations, the U.S. has stood up as the
standard bearer, excoriating those rulers who use their powers
vindictively, against enemies on personal basis, and beckoning
those nations to return to the fold. After all, America sees itself
as the embodiment of human existence at its very best.1 This
statement is consonant with a deeply rooted American faith that
America is a God-ordained 'City on a Hill,' that 'stands taller and
sees farther' than the rest of the world.2
The "Rule of Law" is a critical building block of democratic
governments that in turn is intertwined with a strong view of
human rights. To a certain extent, Rule of Law is premised on
the same presumption of equality that underlies human rights.
Whereas the Rule of Law subjects all parties-both the ruled and
the ruler-to the Law, so too, human rights extends egalitarian
principles to all humans, regardless of such distinctions as
ethnicity, age, race, or sex.
The law is clear on few things, particularly when it comes to
matters requiring coordination under domestic and international
law. One of those few things is torture. Torture is forbidden
universally. It is viewed as contrary to fundamental human
rights. Human rights law dictates that the right not to be
subjected to torture cannot be derogated from in any
circumstances. 3 As a peremptory (jus cogens) norm, the right not
to be subjected to torture dictates that no situation permits a
1 See Paul Street, Beacon To The World, ZNET, Oct. 18, 2002, http://www.zmag.org
/content/printarticle.cfm?itemlD=2501&sectionID=30 (last visited Oct. 8, 2006) (quoting
Senator Kay Bailey).
2 Id. (providing "[I]t is consistent with the more carefully-constructed declarations of
many past American rulers of greater intellectual and oratorical capacity than
Hutchinson (e.g., John Winthrop, James Madison, Woodrow Wilson, John F. Kennedy and
Bill Clinton, to name a few))."
3 See Human Rights Watch, Summary of International and U.S. Law Prohibiting
Torture and Other Ill-Treatment of Persons in Custody, May 24, 2004,
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/24
/usint8614.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006) (explaining "[i]nternational and U.S. law
prohibits torture and other ill-treatment of any person in custody in all circumstances.").
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government to suspend or curtail this fundamental right, not
even a state of emergency. Torture is banned both in times of
peace and in times of war. 4
As the self-proclaimed champion of freedom and democracy,
the world has heard from the USA an un-ending homily about
human rights as one of the critical building blocks of freedom and
democracy. The right to freedom from torture is recognized as an
important aspect in safeguarding the fundamental right to the
security of the person. Torture is the polar opposite of respect for
human rights. Where states condone or practice torture, torture
is incontrovertible evidence of a state's abandonment of
principles in favor of expedience in the administration of
government policy and the sine qua non for the abandonment of
commitment to Rule of Law and human rights.
This signatory role of torture is made by the USA State
Department's annual publication evaluating each country's
human rights record including a comment on the state's restraint
from the use of torture, and condemnation in unqualified terms
of those nations who utilize it.5 This evaluation is intended to
serve as a kind of a 'roll call of shame' to expose breaches of
human rights and to place countries under the glare of
international scrutiny. This publication of violations, it is hoped,
acts as a "soft law" mechanism in the enforcement of the human
right not to be subjected to torture.
The reaction of the USA after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
including its invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent unilateral
military campaign in Iraq, and various executive and legislative
actions have been not merely a quiet abandonment of the Rule of
Law, but through its so-called "War on Terror," a concerted
attack on the Rule of Law. In this paper we shall examine that
attack on those principles, through an examination of cases,
executive actions, legislations, and international law. While the
authors recognize the mythical nature of the Rule of Law, they
maintain that it is a useful myth, in that it helps actors predict
4 See id.
5 See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt
/2005/61550.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006) (stating Country Reports "offer a factual basis
by which to assess the progress made [by 196 different countries] on human rights and
the challenges that remain.").
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with reasonable certainty the actions that will be accepted
internationally (as between nations), help make good policy
decisions and anticipate the actions of others. Furthermore, it
operates as an ideal to aim for and a standard against which
states' actions can be judged. 6
I. THE END OF THE RULE OF LAW: FOCUS ON THE PERSON
The blind-folded Themis is one of law's universally recognized
symbols. It symbolizes the impartiality of law. It follows,
therefore, that laws focused on specific types of individuals are
considered prejudicial and contrary to the Rule of Law's efforts at
objectivity, which draws attention to the fact that laws focused
on particular individuals violate the egalitarian principle of all
being equal before the law. Furthermore, one fundamental tenet
of the Rule of Law is that laws must curb arbitrary behavior by
government. The Rule of Law prohibits governments from
abridging unreasonably the rights of the citizenry. Nevertheless,
recent U.S. domestic laws, namely, the USA PATRIOT Act 7 and
the Homeland Security Act,8 tend to focus on certain classes of
individuals, specifically, non-citizens. These two pieces of
legislation, and as will be discussed below, corollary executive
action, have been highly arbitrary and unreasonable
abridgements of not only non-citizens' rights, but also of the
rights of citizens themselves.
On November 13, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush issued
a President's Military Order (PMO).9 This executive action
precipitated a storm of criticism from both friend and foe. The
first concern is that the PMO was applicable only to non-U.S.
6 See Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner's Clear Reflection of Income Power Under §
446(b) and the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review: Where Has the Rule of Law Gone,
and Can We Get it Back?, 15 AKRON TAX J. 69, 73 (2000) (asserting "rule of law is
articulated as standing for clearly written rules that give notice to the governed in
advance of their application.").
7 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism ("USA PATRIOT Act") Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 811, 115 Stat. 272, 381 (2001) (providing for, among other things, monitoring of foreign
students and fingerprinting of foreigners at ports in United States).
8 Homeland Security Act ("HAS") of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(providing law enforcement agencies with broad powers to monitor non-citizens).
9 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trail of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 222, 57831-36.
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citizens who are determined by the President to be members of
Al-Qaida, to be members of, or to have played a role in
international terrorism, or to have harbored any such person.O
This pragmatic purpose raised doubts about the application of
due process precepts including the presumption of innocence,
whether the usual criminal standard of '"beyond a reasonable
doubt" would apply, and whether acquittals could be reversed.
The PMO further sought to marginalize and alienate courts by
prohibiting judicial review.11 It allows trials to be conducted in
secret, and further sealed the fate of those accused by both
denying them access to the evidence used against them at trial
and diluting the normal rules of evidence. 12
The Rule of Law was further undermined by the
institutionalization of this discriminatory treatment when the
USA Department of Defense ("DOD") subsequently formally
issued its first set of Procedures for Trials by Military
Commission of Certain Non-U.S. Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism on March 21, 2002.13 These DOD procedures
countenance intentional and per se discrimination on the basis of
national or social origin, intentional and per se denial of equal
protection, and 'denial of justice' to aliens in violation of various
international laws. In particular, the DOD procedure allows:
that aliens need may not be tried in civilian courts, accused may
be detained for months without charges, detainees do not enjoy
the right to be brought promptly before a judge or to file habeas
corpus petitions, defense attorneys will lack access to witnesses,
accused will not be able to cross-examine all witnesses against
them, portions of trials can be held in secret, and accused lack
the right of appeal to an independent and impartial tribunal.14
10 Id. (defining "individual subject to this order" as non-United States persons who
are or were al Qaida members, who harbored or abetted al Qaida members, or who
engaged in any form of international terrorism).
11 Kevin J. Barry, Military Commissions: American Justice on Trial, 50 JUL FED. L.
24 (2003) (articulating limited applicability of PMO).
12 Id. at 25 (discussing criticisms following release of President's November 13, 2001
Military Order).
13 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No. 1: PROCEDURES FOR TRIALS
BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS OF CERTAIN NON-U.S. CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST
TERRORISM (Mar. 21, 2002).
14 Id. (outlining trial procedures, which, while facially similar to standard U.S.
procedure, permit courts to close any portion of proceeding to public or to accused himself
for safety and/or national security concerns) (emphasis added).
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The DOD General Counsel's military commission instructions,
issued on April 30, 2003, renewed the concerns that surrounded
the PMO as well as the March 21, 2002 DOD procedures. 15 The
planned military commissions do not demonstrate fairness and
nor do they meet the "exalted" American standards of justice.
Establishment of the structure and regulations for the military
commission trials of individuals designated for such trial by the
President, like the previous directives, offers little comfort. In
fact it only served to renew the criticisms created by the initial
PMO of November 13, 2001,16 and to raise ire both domestically
and abroad. The main criticism was that the U.S. was
undermining both domestic and international set processes and
mechanisms with raw power and ultimately undermining the
basic standards of justice America wishes to be known for.17
The discrimination against non-citizens by the government
was brought home in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.18 Mr.
Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan and, along with other
combatants captured there, taken to Guantanamo. Mr. Hamdi,
however, had the unusual status of U.S. citizenship. As soon as
the U.S. found out he was a citizen, the treatment afforded him
was different from those identified as combatants in Afghanistan.
Rather than suffering the same treatment for the same action as
his fellow Afghanistan combatants, Hamdi was promptly taken
15 DEP'T OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 3: RESPONSIBILITIES
OF THE CHIEF PROSECUTOR, PROSECUTORS, AND ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS (Apr. 30, 2003)
(including within prosecutor's outlined duties, prohibition against disclosing "classified
information, national security information, or state secrets to any person not specifically
authorized to receive such information.").
16 Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 9 (declaring "it is not practicable to
apply in military commissions under this order the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district
courts").
17 It did not help that the action occurred in the shadow of lowered world opinion of
the U.S. due to its unilateral moves regarding the environment and missile defense. The
invasion of Iraq on a mish-mash of excuses also served to reinforce the fears that the
international community had of a hyper-power determined to have its way whether
through law or simply raw power.
18 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Names More Guantanamo Detainees
For Trial, Changes Rules, and Allows First Attorney Meeting For Hamdi, 20.4 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 139 (2004) (outlining Hamdi case's development and concurrent
changes in military tribunal procedure); see also Michael C. Dorf, Who Decides Whether
Yaser Hamdi, or any Other Citizen, is an Enemy Combatant?, FINDLAw, Aug. 21, 2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020821.html (noting potential of Hamdi case to sweep
within its scope all U.S. citizens defined "enemy combatant[s]" and thereby abrogate
rights generally guaranteed under Bill of Rights).
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to the United States for different treatment.' 9 In its essence, this
case was a case of mistaken identity. He is a U.S. citizen who
was initially mistaken for a non-citizen, and afforded different
treatment on the basis of his citizenship, regardless of his
actions. The U.S. made clear in this case that we are not all
equal before the law.
II. THE END OF THE RULE OF LAW: ARBITRARY
DETENTION & SHIFTING PROCEDURE
Another critical aspect of the Rule of Law is the prohibition
against arbitrary detention and the right to clear, established
procedure. These fundamental tenets of the Rule of Law permit
the courts to subject executive action to public scrutiny. More
particularly, these two standards limit the judiciary and
executive's ability to pervert the course of justice for political or
economic ends and they protect the individual from the state.
These Rule of Law standards have been incorporated into many
human rights agreements that require trials to occur before
'regularly constituted' tribunals. 20 Nevertheless, as noted in the
previous section, the U.S. has decided military tribunals will try
aliens. It is doubtful if a military tribunal, whether it is trying a
violation of the laws of war or any other violation, would be
considered a 'regularly constituted tribunal' under either the
Geneva Conventions 21 or the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 22 Military tribunals are ad hoc and set up
19 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510-11 (concluding Authorization for Use of Military Force
resolution ("AUMF"'), sanctioned government's detention of Hamdi).
20 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
21 See e.g., First Geneva Convention; Second Geneva Convention; Third Geneva
Convention; Fourth Geneva Convention (guaranteeing individual's right to be tried and
sentenced before "regularly constituted court" within each Geneva Convention, and
although not expressly declared, military tribunals are not and cannot be conceived as
encompassed by Geneva Convention's language).
22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360
(declaring, in Article 9, that all persons are entitled to due process before courts including
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for a specific purpose; it is this type of tribunal that is specifically
outlawed by these treaties. 23 Considering that the US indicted
the so-called twentieth hijacker, Moussaoui, under domestic and
international terrorism laws, there does not seem to be a either a
legal basis or an actual need for such military tribunals-this
observation is not meant to suggest that claims of necessity
should override the Rule of Law.
The USA has developed yet another strategy for evading the
Rule of Law that condemns arbitrary detention and shifting
procedure: that is it attempts to create a legal black hole to
permit such detentions. 24 The most obvious example of this is in
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,25 where the Supreme Court ultimately
permitted the Administration to persist in detention without
charges or trial.26 In that case, the court permitted Padilla's
application to be denied on the basis that he was in the wrong
jurisdiction, thus nullifying the attempts of his lawyer's
application for habeas corpus. 27 The Court failed to take notice
that the Administration had moved the applicant from one
jurisdiction to another for the purpose of frustrating any writ of
right to trial within reasonable time or release).
23 Warren Richey, Military Tribunals to get a Test in the Supreme Court, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 2005 (noting use of military tribunals to try terror
suspects "mark[s] the first time in a half-century that the US government is relying on ad
hoc military commissions to mete out justice rather than civil federal courts or the
military justice system.").
24 Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole", 10 HUM. RTS.
BR. 2 (2003) (discussing the legal situation of the Guantanamo detainees who enjoy no
legal protections due to the president's classification of them as "unlawful" combatants).
25 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
26 President Bush justified labeling Padilla an "enemy combatant" and detaining him
in military custody by invoking his authority as "Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed
forces", relying on the congressionally enacted Authorization for Use of Military Force.
See id.
27 On June 9, 2002, Padilla was detained in deferral custody within the Southern
District of New York. See id. at 431. That same day, he was transported to South
Carolina. On June 11, 2002, Padilla's counsel filed for habeas corpus in the Southern
District of New York, naming President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Commander
Melanie Marr as respondents. The Government moved to dismiss, arguing that
Commander Marr was Padilla's immediate custodian and therefore the only proper
respondent to the petition. The District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over
Commander Marr because she was not located within the Southern District. Id. at 432.
The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over Padilla's petition does not lie in the
Southern District because it does not have jurisdiction over Marr. Id. at 442. The Court
found that since both Padilla and Marr were present in South Carolina, Marr is the
proper respondent and jurisdiction lies in South Carolina. Id. at 446.
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habeas corpus. 28 Any further application will likely be frustrated
the day before the hearing by simply moving the applicant to yet
another jurisdiction.
In Hamdi, the Court has given the Administration the benefit
of the doubt and shifted the onus to the applicant. 29 It is
manifestly absurd that Hamdi, who has to date been
incarcerated for three years, be required to produce evidence and
witnesses in Afghanistan to attest to his actions at the time in
question. Nevertheless, this is what the Administration has
requested and what the Court acquiesced to.30
One example of this is the case of the British subject held in
Guantanamo. In that case, Abbasi & Anor., v. Secretary of State
for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs,31 a British national, Feroz
Ali Abbasi, held at Guantanamo since January 2002, complained
to British judges that he had been without access to a court or
any other tribunal, or even to a lawyer, since his arrival in
Guantanamo. 32 Abbasi's representatives sought to compel the
British Foreign Office to take some action on his behalf to
challenge his arbitrary detention in Guantanamo. The British
court declined, striking yet another blow at the Rule of Law. The
court did note, however, that although Mr. Abbasi's detention as
an 'enemy combatant' may ultimately be justified, the judges
found it 'objectionable ... that Mr. Abbasi should be subject to
indefinite detention in territory over which the U.S. has exclusive
control with no opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of his
detention before any court or tribunal.' 33 It was in that context
28 See id. at 441 (arguing Padilla's detention and transfer was not motivated by intent
to manipulate).
29 Once the Government presents credible evidence that the applicant meets the
"enemy-combatant criteria," the burden shifts to the applicant to come forth with more
persuasive evidence to demonstrate that he does not meet the criteria. "A burden-shifting
scheme of this sort would meet the goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded
journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while giving due regard
to the Executive once it has put forth meaningful support for its conclusion that the
detainee is in fact an enemy combatant." See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534
(2004).
30 See id. at 533. ("We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker.").
31 (2002) EWCA (Civ) 1598, [1] (Eng.).
32 See id. (explaining that Abbasi seeks judicial review to compel the Foreign Office to
take action on his behalf to remedy his arbitrary detention at Guantanamo Bay).
33 Id. at [651-[66].
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that the British tribunal expressed its deep desire that the U.S.
courts assume jurisdiction so as not to leave Mr. Abbasi in
arbitrary detention. 34 The British court attempted to justify its
avoidance of confronting the issue of the USA's attack on the
Rule of Law by referring to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, which was investigating the detentions.35 The
British Court offered lamely that it "is as yet unclear what the
result of the Commission's intervention will be."36
It is of note that America's move to create a different judicial
process to deal with the Guantanamo detainees entails a process
that draws on the military establishment to act in three different
roles-prosecutor, judge and jury. This situation is contrary to
the ordinary safeguards of due process, a fact reflected in the
U.S. case law if In re Oliver.37 In this 1948 case, the U.S.
Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the ordered
liberty that signifies due process. It established emphatically
that the Constitution would not tolerate a state system by which
a lone official acted as accuser, committing magistrate,
prosecutor, judge, and fact-finder. 38 The U.S. Supreme Court also
addressed an issue that underpins due process-that the judicial
proceedings are public in nature. It made its point on this issue
powerfully and poignantly by referring to the secrecy of the
English Star Chamber and the Spanish Inquisition in the course
of affirming that due process guarantees a right to public
proceedings. 39 Supposedly, the Star Chamber and all its trapping
34 "Mr. Abbasi is at present arbitrarily detained in a 'legal black-hole."' Id. at [641. He
is in a territory entirely under the United States' control. Id. at [66]. Any order made by
the United Kingdom would not be binding on the United States, and therefore the British
tribunal deemed it essential that the United States assume jurisdiction over Mr. Abbasi.
Id. at [67].
35 See id. at [107] (asserting "Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has
taken up the case of the detainees .... It is not clear that any activity on the part of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office would assist in taking the matter further while it is in
the hands of that international body.").
36 Id.
37 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
38 "In this country the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first
appeared in a state constitution in 1776." Id. at 266-67. "The knowledge that every
criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an
effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." Id. at 270.
39 The Court articulated the traditional distrust for secret trials as stemming from
these former practices, stating that "[i]n the hands of despotic groups each of them had
become an instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless
disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial." Id. at 269-70.
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of crude executive fiat trumping judicial process was abolished
close to a half a millennium ago.40 Frighteningly though, the
Guantanamo detainees fall into the legal black hole the U.S.
created specifically for them. It has been argued that the lack of
civilian judicial review of convictions gives President Bush
monarchical powers, more reminiscent of centuries ago than
contemporary paradigms in which the world's governments are
constrained by law.
This approach is startling as external norms re-enforce the
emphasis on the inviolability of the human person which, as
noted, are is also a tenet of the U.S. rights tradition. In so doing,
these universal external norms render impossible the central
premise of the U.S.'s executive policy; that is, that the executive
may construct a legal black-hole, a space within which no rule of
law obtains.
A. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission)
On February 25, 2002, a group of petitioners filed the first
international legal challenge to the Guantanamo detentions with
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission).41 In March 2002, the commission issued a decision
on "precautionary measures" requesting the U.S. "to take the
urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent
tribunal." The decision read, in part:
The Commission notes preliminarily that its authority to
receive and grant requests for precautionary measures under
Article 25(1) of its Rules of Procedure is, as with the practice
of other international decisional bodies, a well-established
and necessary component of the Commission's processes.
40 See generally The Court of Star Chamber 1487-1641,
http://www.britainexpress.com//History
/tudor/star-chamber.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (stating that [i]n 1641 the Long
Parliament abolished the hated Star Chamber, though its name survives still to designate
arbitrary, secretive proceedings in opposition to personal rights and liberty.").
41 See Request by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Human Rights Clinic at
Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law for Precautionary
Measures under Article 25 of the Commission's Regulations, Feb. 25, 2002, available at
http://0-www.ccr-ny.org.newcutter.
newcastle.edu.au:80/v2/legalseptemberj lth/docs/22502RequestforPrecautionaryMeasur
es.pdf.
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Indeed, where such measures are considered essential to
preserving the Commission's very mandate under the OAS
Charter, the Commission has ruled that OAS member states
are subject to an international legal obligation to comply
with a request for such measures....
In light of the foregoing considerations, and without prejudging
the possible application of international humanitarian law to the
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the Commission considers that
precautionary measures are both appropriate and necessary in
the present circumstances, in order to ensure that the legal
status of each of the detainees is clarified and that they are
afforded the legal protections commensurate with the status that
they are found to possess, which may in no case fall below the
minimum standards of non-derogable rights.42
The Commission's request asks the U.S. government for
precautionary measures to protect the detainees' "right to
personal liberty and security, their right to humane treatment,
and their right to resort to the courts for the protection of their
legal rights, by allowing impartial courts to determine whether
the detainees have been lawfully detained and whether they are
in need of protection."43 This request puts the issue about as
plainly as it is possible. The U.S.'s failure to even acknowledge
the problem indicates that it intends to pay no heed to this basic
Rule of Law requirement.
B. Denial of the Right to Judicial Review of Detention
The Rule of Law requires that detainees be brought before the
court to ensure the state is not unlawfully detaining people
whether objectors to the regime, journalists, political opponents,
dissidents, or other parties. The USA has also taken aim at this
tenet of the Rule of Law. The DOD rules reflect an intentional
42 Precautionary Measures in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Mar. 13,
2002), available at http://
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/guantanamomeasures2002.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2006) [hereinafter Precautionary Measures].
43 Id. See also Letter from Ariel Dulitzky, Inter- American Commission on Human
Rights, to Jennifer M. Green et al. (July 3, 2003), available at
http://www.ccrny.orglv2/legal/september1 ith/docs/
73202GovtResponsetoObservationsandIACHRDecision.pdf (reiterating request to
United States).
[Vol. 21:3
THE POST9-11 LEGAL WORLD
denial of the customary and nonderogable human right to take
proceedings before a court exercising judicial power in order to
determine the lawfulness of one's detention and to order release
of the person if detention is not lawful. For example, no
provision exists in the President's Military Order or the DOD
rules for review of detention by a federal court (the appropriate
court for such cases).44
C. Denial of the Right to Review by a Competent, Independent,
and Impartial Court
Further, the Rule of Law requires review by competent,
independent, impartial courts-again, the post-Star Chamber
requirements. The U.S.'s rejection of this tenet by its invocation
of military tribunal regime is also relevant to the more general
and blatant denial of the customary and nonderogable right to
appeal to a competent, independent, and impartial court. No
such right of review exists under either the PMO or the DOD
procedure. 45 Indeed, a "Review Panel" under the DOD rules
consists of three military officers who remain generally under
orders from the President, the DOD, and various others within
the military who have command authority.46
D. Denial of the Right to Trial Before a Regularly Constituted,
Competent, Independent, and Impartial Tribunal Established
by Law
As with the previous section concerning review, the Rule of
44 Neither the President's military order (PMO) nor the DOD Military Commission
Order contain any provision for an independent judicial determination of wrongful
detention. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001); Department of Defense, Military
Commission Order No. 1, (Aug. 31, 2005).
45 The PMO leaves only appeals within the administration, stating that "submission
of the record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence, for review and final
decision by me [the President] or by the Secretary of Defense if so designated by me for
that purpose." Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833, 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001). The DOD likewise leaves
final review to the President, with the only difference being that it is made explicit that
the Secretary of Defense reviews all appeals before submitting them to the President for
final review, or making the final decision himself if designated by the President.
Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, 15-16 (Aug. 31, 2005).
46 The review panel requires only one member to have had experience as a judge.
Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, 16 (Aug. 31, 2005).
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Law also speaks to the nature of the tribunal for trial.
Prosecution before the military commissions will also constitute
denial of the Rule of Law standard: The customary and non-
delegable right to prosecution before a regularly constituted,
competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established
according to law. Under the DOD rules, military commissions
"shall consist of at least three but no more than seven members,"
all of whom must be military officers, and only one of whom, the
"Presiding Officer," must be a lawyer. Under the rules, there is
no procedure for challenging a member of the commission 47 for
cause, although the "Appointing Authority may remove members
or alternative members for good cause."48 What that 'good cause'
may be is unclear. 49 Good cause may be someone whose
commitment to the Rule of Law is greater than his/her blind
loyalty to President Bush.
E. Denial of the Rights to Fair Procedure and Fair Rules of
Evidence
Rule of Law requires certain minimum standards with respect
to procedure and evidence. With respect to evidence, the DOD
rules permit hearsay, unsworn written statements, and other
evidence that would be inadmissible in U.S. federal courts or
courts-martial and deny the right to confrontation or
examination of all witnesses against an accused. 50 Witnesses can
provide testimony "by telephone, audiovisual means, or other
means," undermining of confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses.51 Cross-examination of witnesses against the accused
47 There is no provision among the enumerated "procedures accorded the accused" to
challenge the qualification of the members of the commission. Id. at 6-8.
48 Id. at 3.
49 While the removal clause is preceded by the statement that the members must be
"competent to perform the duties involved," there are definitions of the duties of the
members of the commission given in two different section. The one given in the section is
that they are to "determine the findings and sentence without the Presiding Officer" and
to "vote on the admission of evidence, with the Presiding Officer, in accordance with
Section 6(D)(1)." Id. at 3-4. An enumeration of the "duties of the commission during trial,"
appears in a later section not referenced by this part of the order, and it is in this separate
section in which it states that the trial should be fair. Id. at 3-4, 9.
50 Hearsay evidence is not prohibited by the order, unsworn statements are explicitly
allowed, there is no procedure to exclude evidence for being unduly prejudicial with
regard to their probative value. Id. at 10-11.
51 Id. at 10.
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is only authorized with respect to witnesses "who appear before
the Commission."52
Interestingly, the USA's efforts to undermine this pillar of the
Rule of Law have not gone uncontested by its allies. As Mr.
Downer, the Australian Foreign Minister, over a year ago in the
Hick's case stated that "[w]e don't have an objection to the fact he
will be tried by a military commission but we do want the
military commission proceedings to be fair."53 Mr. Downer said
Australia was unable to prosecute Hicks and Habib under its
anti-terrorism laws because such laws did not exist when Hicks
allegedly trained with A1-Qaeda in late 2000 and early 2001.54
The Australian government noted though that "[t]he proceedings
should be fair and consistent with the types of proceedings we
would have here with a court martial or some similar kind of
judicial process. We want to make sure the military commission
process is fair and meets appropriate standards of judicial
fairness." 55 The British Government has protested a number of
the tribunals' rules. In fact, all three branches of the British
government-its executive, legislative, and judicial
branches-have vigorously protested the conditions of detention
and proposed trial of its nationals.56
Finally, even the U.S. appointed lawyer, Marine Corps Maj.
Michael Mori, who represents Australian detainee David Hicks,
has said "[t]he military commissions will not provide a full and
fair trial,"57 in part because "[t]he commission process has been
created and controlled by those with a vested interest only in
52 Id. at 7.
53 Aaron Partick et al, No Return for David Hicks, July 20, 2003,
http://www.theage.com.au/
\articles2003/07/19/1058545628850.html?oneclick=true (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
54 Tough new terrorism legislation outlawing membership of Al-Qaeda was not
conceived until after the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Centre, months
after Hicks trained in Afghanistan. It was passed in November 2002, a year after he was
captured.
55 Aaron Partick et al, No Return for David Hicks, July 20, 2003, http://www.theage.
com.auiarticles/2003/07/19/1058545628850.html?oneclick=true (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
56 See generally Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of
Evidence, Nov. 8 2002,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2002O3/cmselectlcmfaffll96/196apl4.htm
(last visited Oct. 7, 2006) (expressing British Government's concern with British
national's treatment at Guantanamo).
57 Leigh Sales, Hicks Trial won't be Fair: US Lawyer, ABC News Online, Jan. 22,
2004, http://www.abc.net.aulnews/newsitems/sl029437.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
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convictions." 58 According to Mori, Hicks' detention conditions
have disoriented him and lowered him to the point that his main
preoccupations are the most basic of human needs: food, and
shelter.59
III. THE END OF THE RULE OF LAW: DISCRIMINATING
AMONG ALLIES
On the international level it is customary practice among
nations to accept and acknowledge equality among themselves
and among their citizens. Post 9-11, the USA has unilaterally
abandoned this standard. The U.S. has taken to releasing its
Guantanamo prisoners on an ad hoc basis, seemingly at the
whim of the executive. It has released prisoners from some
countries inimical to U.S. plans, prisoners who are citizens of
others that have shifted in their support of U.S.'s invasion of
Iraq, favored some allies while refusing basic Rule of Law rights
to the citizens of others. On February 11, 2004, for example, the
U.S. released Hamed Abderrahman Ahmed, a twenty-nine-year-
old Spanish national to Spain. 60 He was expected to face
questioning and possibly prosecution in Spain as an alleged
associate of the A1-Qaeda terrorist network.
In 2004, Rhuhel Ahmed, Tarek Dergoul, Jamal Al Harith, Asif
Iqbal and Shafiq Rasul, all British citizens who had been
detained at Guantanamo, were released and returned to their
country's custody.61 Significantly however, the British
Government has acknowledged that due to various obstacles, for
instance, the lack of grounds, the detains are not subject to
prosecution, and thus, upon their return, they will be released. 62
Accordingly, as various human rights groups and media assert,
unless British police obtain legally admissible evidence, 63 the
detainees should be released just as any other citizen would be,
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 John Mintz & Robin Wright, Spanish Detainee Sent Home, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,
2004, at A31.
61 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Free 5 Britons Held at Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2004, at A22.
62 Christopher Adams, UK Pushes for Release of More Detainees, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2004.
63 Editorial, Home to Justice, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2004, at 6.
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so as to avoid creating a special "legal limbo" for the detainees. 64
Similarly, the American Government released another
detainee, Slimane Hadj Abderrahmane, to his country,
Denmark.65 Just as occurred when releasing the aforementioned
detainees to Britain, Abderrahmane was set free once on Danish
soil, as there was neither a legal method by which, nor a legal
reason for which detain him.66 Of course, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense was surprised by Abderrahmane's release,
as the U.S. considered him a threat to its national security.67 Yet,
the Danish government ensured that its police would monitor
him.68
Several other governments, American allies included, have
pressured the United States, to release individuals who are
citizens and nationals of those countries. 69 Combined as of 2004,
there were approximately two-hundred-and-forty-two Kuwaiti,
Saudi Arabian, Yemeni, and Pakistani nationals in detention. 70
The inconsistency in U.S. policy in the detention, prosecution and
release of detainees provides further demonstration of failure to
follow any international law standard,71 particularly where the
detainee is not to be tried by their countries.
The U.S. treatment of Australia calls for particular censure. In
the face of significant domestic opposition and international
condemnation, the Australian government chose to support the
U.S. invasion of Iraq.72 Despite this show of support in the face of
64 Id.
65 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Free 5 Britons Held at Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2004, at A22.
66 Id.
67 John Mintz, U.S. Assailed for Plan to Free Dane With Taliban Ties, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 2004, at A24.
68 Id.
69 Editorial, Home to Injustice, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 21-22, 2004, at 6.
70 John Mintz, U.S. Assailed for Plan to Free Dane With Taliban Ties, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 2004, at A24.
71 See Zagaris, supra note 18 (chronicling conflicts of interest between U.S. national
security and international laws regarding Guantanamo detainees).
72 See Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law in China
and the West & Implications for Commercial Disputes, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 225, 246
n.120 (2006) (providing "[b]oth historic and recent events, including Australia's policy
toward Aboriginal peoples, support of the United States' illegal invasion of Iraq... and
refusal to investigate U.S. abuse of Australian citizen Habib in ... suggest[ ] Australia is
not a Rule of Law state."); Bush Warns Australian Pullout from Iraq Would be
'Disastrous'., ASIAN POL. NEWS, June 7, 2004 (describing "Australia deployed 2,000 troops
to fight in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq ... [Australian Prime Minister John] Howard's
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considerable opposition, the U.S. has refused Australia's requests
for Rule of Law standards to be applied to David Hicks and
Mamdouh Habib, the two Australian citizens held at
Guantanamo mentioned above. 73  Given the Australian
government's support of the U.S. in this most unpopular of
campaigns, the U.S.'s response of continued detention of these
Australian citizens is manifestly absurd.
IV. THE END OF THE RULE OF LAW: RULE BY
PRESIDENTIAL FIAT
As noted in the introduction, the Rule of Law's polar opposite is
the Rule of Men. The Rule of Men permits a select group of
individuals to render decisions arbitrarily, that is, without
guidelines or scrutiny. Thus, in essence, a government operating
under this legal model has unfettered discretion. Paradigmatic
of this approach is President Bush's decision to run the justice
system, at least as it applies to foreign combatants, as a personal
fiefdom.7 4 He issues orders as he sees fit, without regard to the
Rule of Law. The PMO, November 13, 2001-Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 75 declares that the president has power to designate
persons as belonging to the newly created legal categories of
"alleged international terrorist," "member of Al Qaeda," or
"someone who harbors them."76 Subsequently, the Secretary of
Defense must detain such persons. The order goes on to mandate
that "if' an individual falling within one of the aforementioned
categories is tried, he must be tried by a military tribunal.
However, as previously explained, these tribunals are rife with
Liberal Party, which has actively supported the U.S.-led war on terror, faces eroding
support in Australia .... ").
73 Virginia Marsh, Australia Trial for Guantanamo Suspects Ruled Out, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2004.
74 President George W. Bush had declared in November 2001 that "an extraordinary
emergency.., for national defense purposes" necessitated extraordinary treatment of any
non citizen whom he should determine belonged to Al Qaeda or was somehow involved in
"acts of international terrorism" harmful to "the United States, its citizens, national
security, foreign policy, or economy." Bush ordered the Secretary of Defense to detain
what were called "enemy aliens." See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
222, 57831-36.
75 See id. at § 2(a).
76 See id.
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all the Rule of Law problems inherent in such tribunals. 77
Moreover, one must take note of what is absent from the order,
namely, that such persons must actually be tried.78 Rather,
President Bush's order allows for the possibility that these
persons might remain in detention, indefinitely, and without
recourse to the courts, unless and until the President commands
otherwise.
Two notorious examples of Rule by Presidential Fiat are the
cases of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla.79 Following the filing of a
federal petition for habeas corpus on behalf of named detainees
at Guantanamo, the Australian Government, in support of
Hamdi, furnished a letter to the petitioning entities based upon
information from the U.S. that stipulated that the detainees were
being held pursuant to the PMO.80 In doing so, the Australian
Government hoped to compel the USA to follow the Rule of
Law.8i Nevertheless, once the challenge to the detentions was in
proceedings, the U.S. shifted its position, and vaguely suggested
that the detainees are held pursuant to the laws and usages of
war. Out of fear and anger--or perhaps, as supposed by Justice
Rutledge, out of convenience-the U.S. executive deliberately
constructed 'a new legal regime" for treatment of the
Guantanamo detainees.8 2
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 599 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying writ of habeas
corpus as next of friend petition of Federal Public Defender for Eastern District of
Virginia and Christian Peregrim, private citizen, for petitioner Hamdi, classified as
enemy combatant and detained at by U.S. military because neither Public Defender nor
Peregrim satisfied prerequisites for "next of friend" standing); Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting petition of Donna R. Newman
acting as next of friend seeking writ of habeas corpus for Jose Padilla, alleged enemy
combatant by U.S. and Department of Defense's detainee for his alleged involvement with
Al-Qaeda).
80 See Human Rights Damaged by Australian Government Stance on Guantanamo
Bay, INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS AUSTRALIAN SECTION, Sept. 1, 2003, http://www.icj-
aust.org.aul?no=17 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (criticizing "Australia's following of the
United States' proposals without question); see also Robyn E. Blumner, Unjust, Unwise
and Un-American, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003 at
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/08/03/news-pf/Columns/_ Unjustunwise andu.shtml (last
visited Oct. 10, 2006) (characterizing "[jurisdictional] limit [of the PMO as] a political
move designed to make military proceedings more palatable to the public").
81 See id.
82 In re Oliver, the U.S. Supreme Court's i948 consideration of the ordered liberty
that signifies due process, established that the Constitution would not tolerate a state
system by which a lone official acted as accuser, committing magistrate, prosecutor,
judge, and fact-finder. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 281 (1948). Justice Wiley Rutledge
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As a practical matter, "only U.S. courts possess the power to
issue enforceable judgments regarding acts of the U.S.
executive."83 In this regard, Professor Diane Marie Amann in a
concise analysis observes: "in recent decades, extraterritorial
action by the U.S. executive, often pursuant to express direction
from Congress, has become routine. Somewhat less routinely, the
U.S. judiciary has reviewed the validity of such action and, at
times, conferred constitutional protections on overseas
individuals whose liberty U.S. officials had restrained."8 4
However, Professor Amann notes that U.S. case law on
extraterritoriality is erratic, leaving considerable discretion to
each court.8 5 The U.S. courts today have exercised their
discretion in favor of the executive.
In a bid to counter US executive fiat, opponents of the
Guantanamo detentions have invoked international law.
Notwithstanding the Atlantic split, some proponents of the
indefinite detention sought support in European law permitting
derogation of rights in time of emergency. The US executive,
however, failed to find any necessity for seeking to anchor its
experiment in law anywhere outside its own whims. It argued
that it had no obligation at all to prove to any court, not even
U.S. courts that its designate-and-detain policy obeyed U.S. law
let alone any internationally accepted standard.8 6
By way of a plan drafted by the executive branch with no
stressed that resemblance to criminal justice procedures on the European continent could
not save the state's scheme. Id. (Rutledge, J., concurring).
83 See Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 347
(2004) (providing "[a]s a matter of fundamental fairness, therefore, courts must shun
undue deference and instead exercise the option, available to them under internal
jurisprudence, to engage in searching review of executive actions within and without U.S.
territory.").
84 See id. at 314.
85 See generally U.S. v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998) (finding respondent alien could be
held in civil contempt during his deportation hearing and privilege against self-
incrimination could not be claimed, because fear of criminal prosecution by foreign
governments did not apply to privilege); U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992)
(declaring respondent's abduction from Mexico to United States, where he was
subsequently arrested, did not violate previous extradition treaty with Mexico, and thus
did not prohibit his trial in a court in United States); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 265
(1990) (holding protections against unreasonable searches and seizures under Fourth
Amendment did not extend to aliens outside U.S. borders).
86 See John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals; New Rules Also Allow
Leeway on Evidence, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al (reporting that government might
rely on European Court of Human Rights decisions regarding Britain's antiterrorism
efforts in Northern Ireland).
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legislative input,87 the military, the executive arm most affected
by events since September 11, is to act as prosecutor and primary
defender, as judge and jury, as custodian and, potentially, as
executioner. As Justice Rutledge said of an analogous scheme in
Oliver:
This aggregation of powers and inherently concomitant denial
of historic freedoms were unknown to the common law at the
time our institutions crystallized in the Constitution. They are
altogether at variance with our tradition and system of
government. They cannot stand the test of constitutionality for
purposes of depriving any person of life, liberty or property.
There is no semblance of due process of law in the scheme when
it is used for those ends.88
V. THE END OF THE RULE OF LAW: CONTEMPT FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONVENTIONS
To get a sense of the extent of the USA's rejection of the Rule of
Law, consider that it was only after considerable pressure that
the U.S. accepted that the Third Geneva Convention8 9 applies to
persons it captured in Afghanistan and subsequently detained in
special purpose military prisons in Guantanamo. Although the
U.S. finally agreed that the Geneva Conventions (GCs) applied, it
then failed to implement its provisions.90 In other words, its
acknowledgement of the Geneva Conventions' application was an
acknowledgement that there is no legal black hole and that the
Rule of Law has a role to play. Given the USA's decision to
ignore the implications of the GC's application, its
acknowledgement of the GCs appears to be nothing more than a
publicity stunt.
87 See Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2004, at 1 (asserting White House officials devised system circumventing application
through federal courts).
88 333 U.S. 257, 279 (1948).
89 See Lieutenant Colonel (S) Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban
Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of
Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 17 (2004) (stating that Geneva Conventions applied to
Taliban even thoughit was not Afghanistan's recognized government).
90 See William H. Taft, The Geneva Conventions and the Rules of War in the Post-
9/11 and Iraq World, 21 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 149, 154-155 (2005) (noting reports
regarding interrogations exceeding Geneva Convention's bounds).
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A brief explanation of the concept of sovereignty is
fundamental to grasp the significance of the Bush
administration's actions. The meaning of "sovereignty" has
varied throughout history. Historically, sovereignty is
manifested in both practical institutions and political thought.
At its core lies the notion of supreme authority within a territory,
and with the state operating as the political institution in which
that sovereignty is embodied. Sovereignty has two facets at its
core: the "internal" and the "external."9 1 Those words do not
describe exclusive sorts of sovereignty, but different aspects of
the same sovereignty that are coexistent and omnipresent.
Sovereign authority is exercised within borders, "internally" but
also, by definition, with respect to outsiders who are "external"
and may not interfere with the sovereign's governance.
Tying the two facets of law, Lynn S. Bickley observes: "Legal
scholars of the Renaissance and Classical periods saw no
distinction between municipal and international law, instead
recognizing the law of nations as a universal law binding upon all
mankind."92 Indeed, this view is evident in Blackstone's
observation of the law of nations. He wrote international law is:
[A] system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized
inhabitants of the world ... to insure the observance of
justice and good faith, in that intercourse which must
frequently occur between two or more independent states,
and the individuals belonging to each. 93
From the foregoing there can be no doubt that the Rule of Law
has both municipal and international dimensions. The so-called
'War against Terrorism," however, has upset the neat two
faceted paradigm sketched above. Waged inside, as well as
outside of the United States by American officials, and at times
against American citizens, the war has confounded the long
established foreign-domestic dichotomy.
Legal challenges based on the rubric of applicable
91 See Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is
the Sword Mightier than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 213, 219 (2000).
92 Id.
93 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66 (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 1765).
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international law to USA domestic laws have revealed gaps in
the post-September 11 domestic legislation. Neither the Geneva
Conventions nor any other international law applied to all issues
raised by U.S. domestic laws, a number of whose provisions seem
based on policy and expedience. As indicated by the British
Court in the Abbasi case above, no extra-national tribunal
appears competent to pass judgment.94 In any event, it would
appear impossible to issue judgments that adhere to shaky
domestic legislation while rejecting international norms either
implicitly or explicitly. The task of doing justice thus fell to U.S.
courts. Lower courts have tended to dodge careful review, chiefly
by resorting to doctrines of deference and extraterritoriality.95 As
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take up these questions in
2004, two appellate panels issued rulings somewhat less
deferential to the U.S. executive. 96 The ultimate outcome at the
Supreme Court has been a disappointment for parties interested
in civil liberties and the Rule of Law.
Nevertheless, the situation as it now stands leaves the
detainees imprisoned without having gone through competent
tribunals, and unlikely ever to have access to the courts, or fair
trials. The President of the United States recognized in 2001
that Taliban detainees "are covered by" the Geneva Conventions,
and then concluded that neither the Taliban soldiers nor Al-
Qaeda detainees are entitled to Prisoner of War status.97 Now,
94 Abbasi v. Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA (Civ)
1598 [21] (Eng.) (pointing to United States' response to Commission on Human Rights, in
which United States informed Commission that United States alone had jurisdiction over
detainees, and that Commission lacked authority over United States).
95 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.
2002), remanded, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), motion denied, 316 F.3d 450 (4th
Cir. 2003), rev'd, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied. The decisions of the trial court
in Padilla were rather less deferent. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
affd on reh'g, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), appeal granted,
256 F. Supp. 2d 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter Padilla 111].
96 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 540 U.S. 1099 (2004), cert. granted; Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
353 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), affg in part, rev'g.
97 Kenneth Roth, Bush Policy Endangers American and Allied Troops, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Mar. 5, 2002, available at http://www.commondreams.org/viewsO2/0305-09.htm
(last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (stating "Third Geneva convention does not cover members of
Al Qaeda because they are terrorists, not government troops" and that 'Taliban fighters,
whom it does admit are covered by the convention do not qualify for POW [prisoner of
war] status because they allegedly failed to wear distinctive insignia and abide by the
laws of war."); See Marco Sass6li, La "Guerre Contre le Terrorisme, " le Droit International
Humanitaire et le Statut de Prisonnier de Guerre, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 211, 214, n.11
(Donald M. McRae ed) (2001) (explaining even after Administration decided that Geneva
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while it may be that once competent tribunals hold hearings,
they will determine that some or many are not prisoners of war,
such a conclusion does not leave them in a legal black hole as the
administration leads the public to believe with respect to the
international law regime. If the tribunals were to determine that
these detainees are not Prisoners of War, the detainees will fit
into another category or status, but-and this is important-they
will have some status: they will be civilian detainees under the
Fourth Geneva Convention. There simply is no gap between the
conventions. In situations of international armed conflict, when
an individual has committed a "belligerent act" and falls into the
hands of an adversary and doubt arises as to status as a
privileged or unprivileged combatant or civilian, the capturing
power is required to convene a competent tribunal to determine
the status of the detainee and ensure that such persons enjoy the
protections of the Third Geneva Convention. 98 Clearly, the U.S.
has completely failed to fulfill its international legal obligations
in the case of Guantanamo detainees and has chosen instead to
run rough shod over the Rule of Law on the international plane.
Consider further that there is no indication that any of the
detainees has been informed of his or her rights under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, which permits a
foreign national to promptly contact and meet with a consular
representative of his home government.99 Nor does it appear that
any of the other international instruments that apply to protect
the fundamental human rights of the detainees have been
complied with by the USA.
Components of the executive's policy neither comply with many
aspects of international law, nor meet that law's stringent test of
derogation. To hold a person duly judged a Prisoner of War after
hostilities end violates clear mandates of international
humanitarian law.OO To detain anyone, even a presumed leader
Conventions applied to Taliban fighters, they were not recognized as prisoners of war).
98 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 20.
99 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261
(entered into force Mar. 19, 1967) (stating consular officers shall have right to visit
sending State's imprisoned or detained national to converse and correspond with him, and
to arrange for his legal representation).
100 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 20, art. 118 (providing "[pirisoners of war
shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
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of terrorists, without affording him opportunities to consult with
counsel and seek prompt judicial review of custody, is
condemned. To deny detainees humane treatment, and ignore an
injunction that comprehends an absolute prohibition on
techniques of interrogation that profoundly disrupt a person's
psyche, is unconscionable. The U.S. proposal for trials before
special military commissions likewise foretells infringement of
fundamental rights.
To the extent that Rule of Law applies in the international
sphere it is evident that it demands nations to fulfill obligations
under international agreements for purposes of "justice and good
faith" in Blackstone's words, for as he notes pragmatically,
nations often have interactions with each other.101 The impact of
human rights violations (whether on a small or large scale)
impinges directly on important world order values which no
State has dared suggest are not common and shared. If human
rights are considered serious values and matters of international
concern, then "effective policing is required from local to global
levels in the name of the world community as a whole."102
Denying the principles of human rights arguably points to "an
alternative normative order that disparages the precept of
human dignity."103
VI. END OF THE RULE OF LAW: THE USA ABANDONS THE
LAW OF TORTURE
Perhaps nothing makes the U.S.'s decision to abandon the Rule
of Law clearer than its handling of the law of torture. Torture is
among the most widely condemned acts of all humanity. It has
been described as "a cruel assault upon the defenseless"104 and as
"inherently abhorrent."105 Consider even the right wing,
conservative, Judge Richard Posner's pronouncement on the
101 See supra note 93, and accompanying text.
102 Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian Law: Sovereignty, International
Criminal Law And The Ad Hoc Tribunal For The Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 127, 145-146 (1995).
103 Id. at 146.
104 Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 130 (1978).
105 William F. Schulz, The Torturer's Apprentice: Civil Liberties in a Turbulent Age,
THE NATION, May 13, 2002, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020513/schulz
(last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
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matter: "[E]ven a murderer, has a right to be free from
torture."10 6 Its proscription is a peremptory norm of general
international law, a jus cogens. Almost all of the major
international instruments for the promotion and protection of
human rights and those that codify international humanitarian
law condemn torture. 10 7
A. The Torture Convention
Evidencing this universal consensus on the repugnance of
torture, in 1984 the United Nations specifically adopted the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Torture
Convention].810 The Torture Convention defines the term
"Torture" as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.10 9
The Torture Convention goes on to place an obligation on
States' Parties to take "effective legislative, administrative,
judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture" within
their respective territories, and to incorporate the crime of
torture as defined in the Convention into their national criminal
106 Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1993).
107 See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 20, art. 87 (asserting "[c]ollective
punishment for individual acts, corporal punishment, imprisonment in premises without
daylight and, in general, any form of torture or cruelty are forbidden.").
108 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 23 I.LM. 1027 (1984), modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
109 Id. at art. 1.
[Vol. 21:3
THE POST9-11 LEGAL WORLD
justice systems. 1i0  The Torture Convention has certain
outstanding features which are encapsulated eloquently by
Professor Johan D. van der Vyver thus:
Torture is condemned regardless of the circumstances;
The Convention follows the principle of compulsory universal
application: that is to say, it is made applicable to all countries of
the world (and not only to States Parties) so that even acts of
torture committed in a non-Party country are punishable in a
State Party to the Convention;
States Parties are under an obligation not to extradite any
person if there are substantial grounds to believe that the person
would be in danger of being subjected to torture in the state
requesting the extradition;
An order of a superior officer or public authority cannot be
raised as a defense by a person charged with torture
The Convention itself serves as an extradition treaty among
States Parties for purposes of bringing a perpetrator of
torture to justice;
Evidence obtained through torture must be rendered
inadmissible in the criminal justice systems of States
Parties;
The Convention places upon States Parties the obligation to
create a public awareness through education and
information concerning the prohibition of torture.1 11
Although each signatory nation may phrase its definition of
torture differently, the Torture Convention's definition is
generally regarded as "reflecting a consensus 'representative of
customary international law."' 2 One must bear in mind,
however, that the Torture Convention, being an international
treaty, only addresses the obligations of states, and therefore has
a limited application. The customary-law meaning of torture
110 Id. at art. 2, 4 (guiding "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are
offences under its criminal law").
111 Johan D. van der Vyver, Torture as a Crime Under International Law, 67 ALB. L.
REV. 427, 431 (2003).
112 Id. at 432 (2003) (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, P. 459 (1998)).
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exceeds the confines of the Convention: insofar as international
criminal law applies to the criminal conduct of individuals as
well as state officials, the prohibition of torture is not be limited
to acts of torture committed only by state actors.
Importantly, however, the Torture Convention's drafters
accorded the states freedom to punish criminals. Specifically, the
Torture Convention acknowledges that states may impose pain
and suffering; provided it "aris[es] only from or inherent in, or
incidental to, lawful sanctions."ii3 As such, the pain or suffering
in question may be permissible even if it is severe, as long as it
attends legitimate punishment, for instance, pain and suffering
arising from legitimate imprisonment, corporal punishment, or
capital punishment. As Professor Vyver notes, "[t]he phrase was
not intended to exclude or to excuse legally sanctioned
punishments that have all the makings of torture per se. Use of
the word 'only' was designed to make that distinction."114
B. The Torture Convention and the United States
In 1990 the U.S. ratified the Torture Convention, and
implemented it through the enactment of the Torture Convention
Implementation Act [hereinafter the Act]. The purpose of the Act
was to conform the U.S.'s criminal codes with the Convention's
directives.i 5 Torture is defined in the Act as: "an act committed
by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control."1i 6 Similar to other
American jurisprudence traditionally claiming extraterritoriality,
the Act provides for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by
American courts to bring those who committed torture outside
the U.S. to justice within the U.S. notwithstanding victim's or
perpetrator's nationalities.1 1 7  The Act was subsequently
amended to cause a person who conspires to commit torture to be
subject to the same penalties as one who actually committed
113 Torture Convention, supra note 108, at art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
114 Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 433 (2003).
116 Id. at 434.
116 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. 2340).
117 Id. at 434.
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torture. 11 8
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 establishes a cause
of action and remedy to torture victims at the hands of anyone
acting under actual or apparent authority or color of law of any
foreign nation.11 9 Both U.S. nationals and aliens have the right
to claim damages.120 It is important to note, however, that the
American legislation only recognizes state actors as perpetrators
of torture. 121
C. Definitions: Torture as a War Crime versus Torture Under the
Convention
Torture in the context of war is considered a war crime,
regardless of whether the perpetrator was an enlisted member of
the national forces, a recognized resistance group or an
independent civilian. The ICTY emphasized this view in
Prosecutor v. Blaskic.122 It opined that individuals, in order to
determine crimes against humanity, will be treated as civilians
regardless of whether they previously participated in
hostilities.123 Therefore, the ICTY determined that acts causing
serious bodily injury to civilians are war crimes. Professor Vyver
eloquently synthesizes the judgment's import:
Their non-combatant status might derive from the fact
that they were no longer in the army or were no longer
bearing arms, were placed hors de combat by being
wounded, or were being detained by the enemy. In
this regard, the victim's situation at the time the
crime was committed - rather than his or her general
status - will determine his or her standing as a
"civilian" for purposes of crimes against humanity.124
Notably, even if soldiers are present among the targeted
civilians, the wrongful act is not disqualified from being classified
118 See id. (excepting death penalty).
119 Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 1111, at 434.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 135.
122 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-I, Judgment, (Mar. 3, 2000) available at
http://www.un.org/icty[blaskic/trialc1/judgement/.
123 U.N. Judicial Supplement 13, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T (Mar. 3.
2000) available at http://www.un.org/icty/Supplement/suppl3.eblaskic.htm.
124 Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 440.
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as a crime against humanity.125 In this context, contrary to the
aforementioned Torture Convention definition, torture as a war
crime is not limited to state actors' or their agents' conduct.126
The inevitable conclusion seems to be that torture as a crime
under customary international law is free of the Torture
Convention's constraints, which by definition creates a necessary
connection between an act inflicting pain and suffering and
"public officials or persons acting in an official capacity."127
Consequently, torture as a crime under customary international
law is wider in scope than its counterpart under the Torture
Convention.128
Of course, the definition of torture was not born in a vacuum.
Rather, it also reflects the customary-law's concept, and further,
that the Convention's definition should be applied for purposes of
proscribing torture under humanitarian law. We next turn
briefly to consider torture in the context of the Geneva
Conventions, and then consider the impact of the Geneva
Conventions on those to whom may apply. Afterwards, we
provide instances of the U.S.'s steamrolling over the Rule of Law
without as much as a nod to its existence.
i. The Geneva Conventions
Torturing persons protected by any of the Geneva Conventions
is strictly prohibited. The First, Second, and Fourth Geneva
Conventions apply their prohibitions on the use of torture
generally.129 There are, for example, general proscriptions such
as the prohibitions of the "physical mutilation" of a Prisoner of
125 U.N. Judicial Supplement 13, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T. at *5
(Mar. 3. 2000) available at http://www.un.org/icty/Supplement/suppl3-e/blaskic.htm
(stating "presence of soldiers within an intentionally targeted civilian population does not
alter the civilian nature of the population").
126 Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 432-33 (commenting prohibition of
torture should not be limited to state actors).
127 Id. at 437.
128 Id. at 438 (explaining "torture," for purposes of international law, is not confined
to acts by those who are public officials or act in an official capacity).
129 See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 20, art. 3 (criminalizing "violence to
life and person, in particular of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.");
Second Geneva Convention, supra note 21, art. (prohibiting "violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture"); First Geneva
Convention, supra note 20, art 3 (providing, "violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" is "prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever").
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War and "acts of violence or intimidation. .. against prisoners of
war,"1 30 that prohibit torture for purposes unrelated to gathering
information. Moreover, in dealing with Prisoners of War, the
Third Geneva Convention specifically forbids utilizing torture
and any other kinds of coercion as information gathering tools.131
Additionally, the Third Geneva Convention provides that when
questioned, a Prisoner of War is required to disclose his name,
rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal, or serial
number, or any equivalent biographical information.132 However,
the Convention specifies: "No physical or mental torture, nor any
other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of
War who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted or
exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind."133
Furthermore, where an individual has partaken in hostilities
and becomes his adversary's captive, he is presumed a Prisoner
of War. 134 By contrast, where one's status is doubtful, that
individual is entitled Prisoner of War privileges until a
competent court concludes upon his or her status. 135 As
previously noted, prisoner-of-war status is an extremely
important right afforded to combatants who have fallen into the
power of the enemy. The U.S.'s failure to afford Prisoner of War
status to Taliban captives detained in Guantanamo Bay following
the war in Afghanistan clearly constitutes a flagrant violation of
the Geneva Conventions. Arguably, this criticism also applies to
the U.S.'s treatment of members of Al-Qaeda held captive there.
To take a second example, in terms of the Third Geneva
130 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 20, art. 13.
131 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 20, art. 17 (declaring "[n]o physical or
mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to
secure from them information of any kind whatever.").
132 Id. (providing "[e]very prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to
give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and arm, regimental, personal
or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.").
133 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 20, art. 17.
134 See id. art. 4 (listing different types of people parking in hostilities who "have
fallen into the power of the enemy" as prisoners of war).
135 See id. art. 5 (asserting "[sihould any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any
of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the
present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.").
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Convention, combatants include, without further qualification,
members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, including
members of militias or volunteer corps that form part of those
forces.136 Non-recognition of a government by its belligerent
adversary is of no consequence as far as the combatant status of
members of the armed forces of that government is concerned.
Al-Qaeda captives, while not having been part of the armed
forces of Afghanistan, might still be entitled to protection. They
can most likely be classified as (guerilla) combatants who, owing
to the nature of the hostilities, were not required to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population. 137 A member of a militia
falling within this category will qualify as a combatant, and
therefore will be entitled to prisoner-of-war status, provided that
"he carries his arms openly: (a) during each military engagement
and (b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while
he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching
of an attack in which he is to participate."
ii. Torture and Inhuman Treatment
Torture as a war crime must be distinguished from the lesser
harm of inhuman treatment. The distinction is one of degree,
depending on the intensity of the suffering inflicted. The General
Assembly of the United Nations, on one occasion, described
torture as "an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment,"138 and the European
Court of Human Rights has on several occasions emphasized that
the special stigma of torture attaches only to "deliberate
inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering."139
136 See id. at art. 4 (stating "members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict as
well as members of militias of volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces" are also
considered prisoners of war).
137 See id. (defining "persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews..." as prisoners of
war, and that "members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not
benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.").
138 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX),
91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
139 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 59 (1978) (stating torture need
"attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering."); see also Aydin v. Turkey, 50 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 1867, 1891 (1997)
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As we shall see the proscription of inhuman behavior is
particularly pertinent with respect to the USA interrogations.
In the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom,140 the European
Court of Human Rights evaluated certain "sensory deprivation"
techniques applied by security forces in Northern Ireland as a
means of obtaining information from detainees of suspected
terrorist activities. 141 Those techniques consisted of wall-
standing (forcing detainees to remain standing for long periods of
time in a stressful position), hooding (covering the detainees'
heads with a black or navy colored bag and removing it only
during actual interrogations), subjection to noise ("holding the
detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud and
hissing noise"), deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and
drink pending interrogations.142 Although the court decided that
these techniques did not amount to torture by a thirteen to four
vote, in a sixteen to one vote the court decided that the methods
used to extract information from the detainees, when considered
together, did constitute inhuman and degrading treatment. 143
Similarly, the Israeli Supreme Court also has had occasion to
consider the legality of methods of interrogation applied to
Palestinian captives in that country-such as shaking a captive
forward and backward, holding someone in the "shabach"
position, forcing persons being interrogated in a "frog crouch,"
depriving prisoners of sleep, and subjecting detainees to loud
music.144 The court, citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, decided
that these means of interrogation constituted a violation of the
detainees' human rights, and were therefore illegal under the
(describing the difference between inhuman and degrading treatment and torture as
requiring torture to be "deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering."); Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep 2261, 2279 (1996) (noting
torture can "attach only to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel
suffering).
140 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 59 (1978).
141 See id. at 35.
142 Id. (listing five distinct alleged torture techniques).
143 See id. at 86 (concluding "five techniques... constituted a practice of inhuman
and degrading treatment, which practice was in breach of Article 3 [of the Geneva
Convention]").
144 See Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Service's Interrogation Methods, Sept. 6, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1474-76
(describing shaking as the harshest technique, whereby suspect's upper torso is forcefully
shaken back and forth, causing the neck and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly).
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prevailing Israeli law.145
There is compelling evidence that the United States employs
methods of interrogation which although falling short of the
torture threshold, have nevertheless been clearly condemned in
international law as cruel and inhuman treatment. For example,
an article in THE WASHINGTON POST, for example, referred to
"intelligence specialists familiar with CIA interrogation methods"
as authority for allegations that Afghan detainees who refuse to
cooperate inside secret CIA interrogation centers 'are sometimes
kept standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spray-
painted goggles... [and] are held in awkward, painful positions
and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour bombardment of lights-
subject to what are known as 'stress and duress' techniques.146
Such interrogation techniques are flagrant violations of
international law norms with respect to the inhuman treatment,
and as such serve as an indication of the U.S.'s abandonment of
the Rule of Law at the international level.
The administration's attempts to obfuscate the situation and
outright prevarications are particularly disturbing. For instance,
let us consider Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld's,
statements. In January 2002 he stated: "Let there be no doubt,
the treatment of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay is proper, it's
humane, it's appropriate, and it is fully consistent with
international conventions." 147 He continued, "[n]o detainee has
been harmed. No detainee has been mistreated in any way. And
the numerous articles, statements, questions, allegations, and
breathless reports on television are undoubtedly by people who
are either uninformed, misinformed or poorly informed."148
Further, explaining his view of the prisoner's treatment vis-a-vis
the Geneva Convention, Rumsfeld asserted, "[tihey are being
treated in a manner that's consistent with the Geneva
Convention, whether or not they merit that kind of a treatment.
145 See 38 I.L.M. at 1484 (finding these interrogation exceeded State's authority to
conduct interrogations).
146 Dana Priest & Barton Gelman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A01.
147 NewsMax.com, Rumsfeld Chides Pro-terrorist Complainers, Jan. 23, 2002,
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/1l/22/151910.shtml (last visited Oct. 10,
2006).
148 Id.
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That is what the United States does."149 Again, we note that the
evidence is clear that the U.S., contrary to its public statements,
international obligations, and with complete disregard of the
Rule of Law, has employed inhumane techniques in Guntanamo,
Abu Ghraib, and presumably elsewhere. The evidence from the
Red Cross, former detainees and current detainees makes it clear
that the United States is torturing detainees in clear breach of its
international obligations under the Geneva Convetion, and
making it evident that Secretary Rumsfeld has lied to the
public.150
D. Legitimating of Torture?
As previously noted, the prohibition of torture in international
law knows no exceptions. Thus, although it is common for
human rights instruments to make allowance for deviations from
the norms in times of a national emergency, such allowances are
not available when it comes to torture. A directive of the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe proclaims in
this regard:
1. When the fight against terrorism takes place in a situation
of war or public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation, a State may adopt measures temporarily derogating
from certain obligations ensuing from the international
instruments of protection of human rights, to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, as well as
within the limits and under the conditions fixed by
international law....
2. States may never, however, and whatever the acts of the
person suspected of terrorist activities, or convicted of such
activities, derogate from.., prohibition against torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment .... 151
149 Id.
150 "[T]he United States decreed that no member of the Taliban's armed forces was
entitled to POW status ... the United States insisted that no members of Al Qaeda
deserved Geneva Conventions protection - not even those captured while fighting for
Taliban armed forces." Jamie Fellner, Double Standards: Prisoners of war in Iraq and at
Guantanamo, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 31, 2003, available at http://www.iht.com
/articles/2003/03/31/edfellner -ed3_.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
151 Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on human
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Following September 11th, the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe explicitly considered the application of torture
to the fight against terrorism. It concluded as follows:
The use of torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment is absolutely prohibited, in all circumstances,
and in particular during the arrest, questioning and
detention of a person suspected of or convicted of terrorist
activities, irrespective of the nature of the acts that the
person is suspected of or for which he/she was convicted.152
The Committee also stated that persons "arrested or detained
for terrorist activities must be able to challenge the lawfulness of
[their] arrest" or detention in a court of law. 153 These directives
accurately encapsulate the current state of international law,
which under the norms enunciated in the Torture Convention,
and indeed as a matter of customary international law, is binding
on the United States.154
In the Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Services Interrogation Methods, the Israeli Supreme
Court considered whether necessity can be relied upon to legalize
the use of unbecoming methods of interrogation on suspected
terrorists. 155 The court decided that necessity is only a ground of
justification that can be raised by an accused torturer at his or
her trial, and that the use of physical force can consequently not
be permitted in advance. 156 Necessity, thus, cannot create an a
priori source of administrative power to infringe upon human
rights, though it might, in the appropriate circumstances, serve
as a defense against liability.
rights and the fight against terrorism (July 11, 2002), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/E/Human_
Rights/Lignes dir compendiumen.asp#TopOfPage (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
152 Id.
153 Fellner, supra note 150.
154 Johan D. van der Vyver, supra note 111, at 460-61.
155 Article 34(1) of the Penal Law of Israel provides:
A person will not bear criminal liability for committing any act immediately
necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself
or his fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from the
particular state of things [circumstances], at the requisite timing, and absent
alternative means for avoiding the harm.
38 I.L.M. at 1485.
156 See 38 I.L.M. at 1486 (declaring "the very nature of the defence does not allow it
to serve as the source of a general administrative power.").
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The United States has yet to acknowledge its decision to create
and implement a policy of inhumane treatment of detainees.
Why it has done so is a matter of speculation. However, certainly
there are two possible consequences. First, the United States'
policies undermine its myths of moral superiority, following of
Rule of Law and its purported concern for human rights.
Secondly, the policies could undermine popular support for the
current administration.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the post-September 11, 2001, Bush
administration has changed the rules of the game. While still
holding the United States out as the white knight, victim of
terror and beacon of democracy, it has become despotic in its own
territory, denying the application of the principles of the Rule of
Law to individuals in its own territory. Furthermore, it has in
practice become a rogue state in international law, defying
international bodies, breaching international law conventions
and their consequent duties, and even abandoning the Rule of
Law. These developments, to say the least, are troubling. In
some ways, it may be fair to characterize these changes as the
end of the Rule of Law. Perhaps the old maxim "the first victim
of war is truth" should be amended by adding, "and with it, the
Rule of Law."
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